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Recent analyses of transaction-level datasets have generated new stylized facts on price setting and
greatly influenced the empirical open- and closed-economy macroeconomics literatures. This work
has uncovered marked heterogeneity in price stickiness, demonstrated that even non-zero price changes
do not fully "pass through" exchange rate shocks, and offered evidence of synchronization in the timing
of price changes. Further, intrafirm prices have been shown to differ from arm's length prices in each
of these characteristics. This paper develops a state-dependent model of intermediate goods pricing,
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Recent analyses of transaction-level datasets have generated new stylized facts on price setting
and greatly in￿ uenced the empirical open- and closed-economy macroeconomics literatures.
This work has uncovered marked heterogeneity in price stickiness, demonstrated that even
non-zero price changes do not fully "pass through" exchange rate shocks, and o⁄ered evidence
of synchronization in the timing of price changes. Further, intra￿rm prices have been shown
to di⁄er from arm￿ s length prices in each of these characteristics. This paper develops a state-
dependent model of intermediate goods pricing, which allows for arm￿ s length and intra￿rm
transactions, and is capable of generating these empirical pricing patterns.
Macroeconomists have long analyzed the impact of price adjustment costs using time-
dependent pricing models in which ￿rms cannot control the timing with which they change
prices. These models, such as those in Taylor (1980) or Calvo (1983), o⁄er the important
advantage that they allow for analytical solutions. They generally cannot, however, match
many of the patterns uncovered in the new micro datasets.
For example, there have been several studies of item-level price adjustment underlying the
CPI and import price index, such as Bils and Klenow (2004), Nakamura and Steinsson (2008),
and Gopinath and Rigobon (2008). These papers document signi￿cant cross-sectional di⁄er-
ences in price stickiness and further, di⁄erences are often correlated with economic fundamen-
tals. Items with a higher elasticity of demand change prices more frequently. Time-dependent
models cannot endogenously generate this because they exogenously de￿ne the period, or av-
erage period, during which a price remains ￿xed. Cavallo (2009) and Midrigan (2006) ￿nd
synchronization in the timing of changes in retail prices on the internet and in grocery stores,
respectively. Similar to the case of heterogeneous stickiness, in the absence of a synchronized
cost shock, time-dependent models have little scope for generating bunching in the timing of
price changes.
State-dependent models allow ￿rms to optimally decide when it is worth paying an adjust-
ment cost in order to change prices. These models typically feature monopolistic competition,
so strategic responses of ￿rms need not be considered. For instance, with a continuum of com-
petitors with in￿nitesimal market shares, knowledge of the aggregate price index is often a
su¢ cient statistic summarizing the actions of other ￿rms. As such, ￿rms need not consider the
1response of any given competitor when choosing to change its own prices. Like time-dependent
setups, state-dependent models with monopolistic competition also cannot generally match
these new empirical pricing patterns.1,2
This is particularly important for work on international trade, as papers such as Gopinath
et al. (forthcoming), Burstein and Jaimovich (2009), and Fitzgerald and Haller (2009) have all
documented the degree to which exchange rate passthrough or pricing to market ￿equivalent
for the purpose of this paper ￿is incomplete. This is not simply a re￿ ection of nominal
rigidity, but rather, holds true even after prices have changed. Most state-dependent models
with monopolistic competition, however, use CES preferences that generate constant-markup
pricing and counterfactually imply complete cost passthrough.3
Finally, Bernard et al. (2006), Hellerstein and Villas-Boas (forthcoming), and Neiman
(2010) use micro-data to examine di⁄erences in these dynamic pricing characteristics between
arm￿ s length and intra￿rm trade transactions. All three papers ￿nd that intra￿rm prices
exhibit higher exchange rate passthrough, and Neiman (2010) additionally ￿nds that they
exhibit less stickiness and synchronization.4 Though a state-dependent model without mo-
nopolistic competition is likely required to generate these facts, additional structure is also
needed to model the di⁄erence between arm￿ s length and intra￿rm trade.
Below, I consider a two-￿rm game in a partial equilibrium environment with trade in
intermediate inputs. Upstream ￿rms sell the inputs downstream to either an unrelated party
or a wholly owned subsidiary. Each manufacturer￿ s pricing strategy is a function of the
other ￿rm￿ s pricing strategy. The model is capable of delivering all of the empirical facts
described above: (1a) Arm￿ s length price duration is heterogenous, decreases as goods become
less di⁄erentiated, and (1b) is smaller for intra￿rm prices; (2a) Passthrough is incomplete
even after prices change and (2b) higher for intra￿rm trades; (3a) Price changes exhibit
synchronization, but (3b) less so for intra￿rm prices. The empirical motivation for the paper
comes largely from papers analyzing international trade data, where it is easiest to measure
1For example, Midrigan (2006) has to introduce increasing returns in the production function of price
changes in order to generate synchronization.
2See Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) for additional empirical features which present di¢ culties for standard
time- and state-dependent models.
3The use of Kimball (1995) preferences in Gopinath and Itskhoki (forthcoming) or the use of translog
preferences in Bergin and Feenstra (2000) are exceptions.
4The results in Neiman (2010) are for the set of di⁄erentiated traded goods and exclude, for example,
commodities.
2cost shocks (since the exchange rate acts as an observable cost shifter) and observe intra￿rm
transactions. I note, however, that the mechanisms in the model and importance of the
dynamics are just as salient for domestic transactions.
I start with the unrelated party, or arm￿ s length, case. These ￿rms face idiosyncratic pro-
duction cost shocks and decide whether to keep their existing price or pay an adjustment cost
to change it. The degree to which the cost shock renders the ￿rm￿ s current price suboptimal
depends on the elasticity of demand. This generates heterogeneity in stickiness. Further, the
inputs are substitutes, so a price change by the competitor ￿rm will also change the prof-
itability of an existing price and may induce a response. This generates both incomplete cost
passthrough and synchronization in the timing of price changes.
The dynamics are somewhat di⁄erent when the downstream input purchaser is a related
party. In this case, the upstream ￿rm attempts to avoid double marginalization and sets
trade prices to approximately follow marginal cost. Accordingly, intra￿rm price setting is
primarily inward looking and responds less to competitors￿prices, which leads to less price
synchronization and greater passthrough of marginal cost shocks. Further, all other things
equal, price duration (a measure of stickiness) is positively related to a ￿rm￿ s market share,
and negatively to the cost of goods sold and the constancy of its markups. Conditional on
market share, the related party cost of goods sold will be higher (and conditional on the cost
of goods sold, related party market share will be smaller). Related party markups are also
less variable. On average, this will result in shorter related party price duration.
In sum, many of the new facts on import, export, producer, and retail prices suggest the
need for a dynamic model of price adjustment with at least four features: ￿rms with posi-
tive market shares, price adjustment costs, di⁄erent vertical structures, and state-dependent
pricing. I now describe a partial equilibrium model with these features that is capable of
producing the salient facts on arm￿ s length price setting ￿and the comparison along these
dimensions with intra￿rm price setting ￿found across a large set of empirical studies.
2 A Partial Equilibrium Model of Trade in Intermediate Goods
The model is a nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) structure closely related to
that used in Yang (1997) and more recently in Atkeson and Burstein (2008). An in￿nitely lived
3representative consumer buys a continuum of ￿nal goods that are assembled by distributors
from two inputs. Under one structure studied, both inputs are produced at arm￿ s length.
I also consider a structure in which one input is produced at arm￿ s length and the other is
produced by a wholly-owned subsidiary.
The cost of production for these inputs varies over time due to idiosyncratic cost shocks.
Distributor pricing is completely ￿ exible, while manufacturers must pay a ￿xed adjustment
cost to change their prices.5 Consumers maximize their lifetime expected utility and arm￿ s
length manufacturers maximize their lifetime expected pro￿ts. Integrated ￿rms maximize the
lifetime combined pro￿ts of their manufacturing plants and distributors.
I consider an exogenously imposed vertical ownership structure for any given industry. Due
to double marginalization, there is always an incentive in the model to vertically integrate.
Hence, to generate the existence of both structures, I am implicitly assuming a ￿rm-speci￿c
integration cost that varies randomly, even conditional on all the variables in the model.
If simulated in a multi-￿rm setting, this would produce a combination of integrated and
arm￿ s length ￿rms in most sectors. The starkest example of such a cost in the international
setting would be a ban on foreign ownership in certain countries and sectors.6 To the extent
integration costs are ￿xed in nature, the ￿rm-speci￿c reason (or lack thereof) for integration
should not impact pricing.
2.1 Consumers
Consumers maximize their expected lifetime utility of consumption, a discounted consump-
tion stream at times t, Et
P1
t=0 ￿








over a continuum of ￿nal goods c that are indexed by z 2 [0;1]. As is
standard in this setup, consumer demand for good c(z) is ct(z) = Ct (pt(z))
￿￿ (P t)
￿, where








5The assumption of greater ￿ exibility in downstream prices is supported in the data. See, for instance,
Shoenle (2009) and Gopinath and Rigobon (2008).
6For example, foreign direct investment, a necessary precursor to intra￿rm trade, was highly restricted in
China and India during most of the datset.
42.2 Distributors
There is a continuum of distributors that costlessly assemble each ￿nal good using a CES

















where ￿ < ￿(z) < 1 and ￿(z) 2 (0;1) for all z. Sectors with higher values of ￿ are less
di⁄erentiated as the distributor can more easily substitute away from any given input in those














which results in demand for the ￿rst manufactured input (expression for the second input,





























is the total unit production cost of the ￿nal good. Distributors then set price at a constant
markup over this marginal cost of production, pt (z) = (￿=(￿ ￿ 1))xt(z).
2.3 Manufacturers
Intermediate good manufacturers use a linear technology to produce ct
j(z) at a constant mar-




j(z) shifts the marginal costs of ￿rm j supplying inputs for ￿nal good z
at time t. In an open-economy setting, it can alternatively be thought of as an exchange rate.
In a closed-economy setting, it can be thought of as an idiosyncratic productivity term. In
describing the model, I will focus on this the case where the two ￿rms￿shocks are uncorrelated.
I do this to emphasize that the model generates synchronized price changes even when cost
5shocks are not synchronized, an assumption that is perhaps most natural in the international
setting. The framework, however, can handle any correlation structure.
A share of the total production costs, (1￿￿), is impacted by this shock. This captures the
case when productivity gains only impact certain production processes, or in the open-economy
case, when the exchange rate does not fully impact the unit cost because the manufacturer
itself imports intermediate inputs from abroad. Though I do not focus on any particular set of
quantitative estimates, I introduce ￿ to come closer to matching the highly incomplete rates










j(z) is normally distributed with cumulative distribution function Fj(￿j(z)). This
allows for shocks that are strongly mean-reverting as well as those arbitrarily close to fully
persistent (as ￿ ! 1).
2.4 Price Setting: Arm￿ s Length Trades
I start by considering the case in which both input suppliers are unrelated to their customer
and trade at arm￿ s length. Unlike the distributors, the manufacturers pay a ￿xed cost to change
their nominal prices. These trades are business-to-business transactions, and hence, this ￿xed
cost is more typically thought to re￿ ect the cost of changing processes, communicating, and
negotiating with customers than the retail price interpretation as "menu" costs (See Zbaracki
et al., 2004).
Each period, the manufacturer that provides the ￿rst input (the setup is symmetric, so we
focus on this manufacturer without loss of generality) earns operating pro￿ts ￿1 = p1c1￿m1c1,
which are de￿ned to exclude the cost of price adjustment. For notational convenience, I drop
















￿￿ (p1 ￿ m1):
Arm￿ s length manufacturers maximize the present value of real pro￿ts, less real adjustment


















j is an indicator function equalling 1 when pt
j 6= p
t￿1
j and 0 otherwise.
2.5 Price Setting: Intra￿rm Trades
We can also use the model to consider the case in which one product is assembled from a
related party, which sells its input to a wholly owned subsidiary (or parent). We do not
consider the case in which both ￿rms are related parties as this would render the setup, in
which manufacturers do not coordinate price-setting with each other, unrealistic. Distributors
that purchase from a related party also purchase from arm￿ s length suppliers, a feature that
is supported in the data.7
Vertically integrated ￿rms aim to maximize overall pro￿ts ￿ the sum of its pro￿ts at
the manufacturer and distributor levels ￿as follows. The manufacturing ￿rm (or a separate
headquarters division) instructs the distributor to take input prices as given, and to purchase
from the arm￿ s length or related party manufacturer in whatever way maximizes distributor
pro￿ts. This should not be interpreted as if the distributor is naive of the ownership structure
or acts myopically, but rather, is simply following the pricing mechanism designed by the
integrated ￿rm. As part of this mechanism, the manufacturer knows how the distributors
will act and thus chooses prices in order to maximize the expected present value of all future
integrated pro￿ts, after subtracting price adjustment costs.8 Anecdotal evidence suggests that
the essence of this pricing mechanism is used by actual companies.9
Without loss of generality, I assume the related party manufacturer in this case supplies
7Bernard et al. (2007) shows that the vast majority of ￿rms that import from related parties also do so
from arm￿ s length suppliers.
8I assume the manufacturer would incur the adjustment cost if it communicated its desired price to the
distributor, even if it does not actually change its price to that level. This is consistent with the above
interpretation of an adjustment cost and rules out a potentially more pro￿table mechanism whereby the
distributor changes its price even if its suppliers do not change theirs.
9The managing director of a consulting ￿rm specializing in transfer pricing told me of the case of a
large multinational company that evaluates upstream manufacturing managers on their ability to minimize
production costs, without any link to the upstream unit￿ s pro￿ts (the company delegates the determination of
transfer prices, but not retail prices, to a separate group that aims to maximize overall ￿rm pro￿tability). The
consultant described another integrated relationship in which the downstream unit, by design, made purchases
without even knowing which suppliers were related parties and which were arm￿ s length ￿rms. Both anecdotes
support the idea in the model that transfer prices may be both allocative and designed to maximize the sum
of upstream and downstream pro￿ts.













= pc ￿ p1c1 ￿ m2c2; (3)




































Vertically integrated ￿rms maximize the present value of real pro￿ts, less real adjustment
costs ￿RP=P t, and maximize an expression equivalent to (2). The related party manufacturer
pays an adjustment cost because coordination, communication, and process changes between
business units of the same ￿rm are also costly.
3 Determinants of Pricing Patterns
In this section, before proceeding to the full dynamic model￿ s solution and simulation, I try
to build intuition for the model￿ s ability to match characteristics in the data. We start with
the case without nominal rigidities (￿AL = ￿RP = 0). In this ￿ exible price setting, I focus
on synchronization and passthrough. I next add an adjustment cost, take an approximation
of the ￿rm￿ s pro￿t function, and run some simple one-period numerical examples. These are
designed to generate intuition for the determinants of price duration. These exercises suggest
the model will produce the patterns on duration, passthrough, and synchronization found in
the data.
3.1 Flexible Price Passthrough and Synchronization: Arm￿ s Length Prices
The arm￿ s length ￿rm￿ s optimal price is set by taking its competitor￿ s price as given and
pricing at a variable markup over marginal cost, pj =
"(sj)
"(sj)￿1mj. The market share of arm￿ s













8and the elasticity of demand, "j, is the market-share weighted average of the elasticities of
substitution for ￿nal goods and for the sector￿ s intermediate inputs:
"j (sj) = ￿sj + ￿(1 ￿ sj):
The optimal price depends on both the ￿rm￿ s own cost and, through its impact on market
share, the competitor￿ s price. This strategic complementarity is often assumed away in setups
with monopolistic competition. Arm￿ s length markups decrease with the elasticity of demand,
and ￿rms with given market shares will charge lower markups for more substitutable goods.
Totally di⁄erentiating the markup, elasticity, and market share de￿nitions, I approximate
the change in arm￿ s length price as a weighted average of the shocks to a ￿rm￿ s own cost and
its competitor￿ s price:
b pj = ￿jc mj + (1 ￿ ￿j) c p￿j = ￿￿j￿j + (1 ￿ ￿j) c p￿j; (4)
where:
￿j =
"j ("j ￿ 1)
"j ("j ￿ 1) + (￿ ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ 1)sj (1 ￿ sj)
; (5)
and where b x = dx=x denotes the size (in percent) of a change in a variable x. Expression (4)
measures the responsiveness of the arm￿ s length ￿ exible price to a percentage change in mar-
ginal cost or to its competitor￿ s price. It assumes that the competitor does not subsequently
change its price further. ￿￿j approximates passthrough of the cost shock for arm￿ s length
￿rms. Given that ￿;￿j 2 (0;1), arm￿ s length passthrough will be incomplete, even after a
price changes, consistent with the data. As the elasticity of demand "j changes with market
share, the markup "j=("j ￿ 1) will change, and a varying amount of the cost shock will be
absorbed, rather than passed through.
Now, we consider the case where each ￿rm does respond to any change in the other ￿rm￿ s
price. Substituting c p￿j = ￿￿j d m￿j + (1 ￿ ￿￿j) b pj into (4), I write :





9where j and ￿j are arm￿ s length ￿rms and:
￿j =
￿j
￿j + ￿￿j ￿ ￿j￿￿j
2 (0;1)
is now the equivalent expression to (5). ￿￿j is now an approximation to cost passthrough.
Note that ￿j > ￿j, implying that an arm￿ s length ￿rm with a given market share will have
higher passthrough when competing against a more responsive ￿rm than otherwise. Here, we
see analytically that this implication of strategic complementarity, which is often abstracted
from in state-dependent models, can be important, particularly at low levels of stickiness.
3.2 Flexible Price Passthrough and Synchronization: Intra￿rm Prices
In this setting with zero adjustment costs, pricing for related parties is simple. Comparing the
expression for distributor per-period pro￿ts in equation (1) with that for the integrated ￿rm
in equation (3), it is clear that in order for the solution to the distributor￿ s problem to always
equal the solution to the integrated ￿rm￿ s problem, related party manufacturers should charge
their marginal cost: pj = mj if j = RP. As discussed in Hershleifer (1956), the transfer occurs
at marginal cost because the ￿rm wants to use inputs as e¢ ciently as possible in generating
the ￿nal good, since the ￿nal good consumer is the only real customer. Above, heterogeneous
good arm￿ s length ￿rms were shown to charge higher markups than homogenous good arm￿ s
length ￿rms. Combined with marginal cost transfer pricing, this implies that intra￿rm prices
of equivalent goods will be lower than arm￿ s length prices, and the di⁄erence should be larger
for heterogeneous goods. This is precisely the result found empirically in Bernard et al. (2006).
With no adjustment costs, related parties will fully pass through the portion of the shock
￿j that changes its unit cost. In particular:
b pj = c mj = ￿dej ￿ ￿￿j if j = RP; (6)
where the approximation becomes an equality as ￿ ! 1. Hence, intra￿rm passthrough equals
￿. Incomplete passthrough in the related party ￿ exible price case is entirely due to the
existence of some share of the marginal cost being una⁄ected by the cost shocks.
In this sense, the related party manufacturer is less concerned with the arm￿ s length
10￿rm and is focused entirely inward, on its own marginal cost. In the dynamic model with
adjustment costs, related parties will not strictly price at marginal cost because the ￿rm must
weigh whether it prefers to be slightly above or below its ideal ￿ exible price in future periods
where a price change is not warranted. It will remain true in the model, however, that related
party passthrough is very close to ￿. This implies, consistent with the empirical results, that
intra￿rm passthrough will be higher than arm￿ s length passthrough. Further, the competitor
￿rm￿ s price is absent from the pricing equation (6), so this model will generate less intra￿rm
synchronization, also consistent with the data.
3.3 Static One-Period Game: Arm￿ s Length Case
I now return to the environment with positive adjustment costs and consider the model￿ s
ability to match the empirical ￿ndings that price duration is larger for more heterogenous
products and that prices change with signi￿cant synchronization. This model will be able to
generate both of these comparative statics.
As seen in equation (4), there are two shocks that could lead a ￿rm to change its price
￿a shock to its own production cost and a change in its competitor￿ s price ￿and a host of
conditions and parameters, such as the market share and the size of the adjustment cost, that
in￿ uence this decision. To build intuition, I start by considering a one-period game where
there is no price response from competitors and ￿rms start in their ￿ exible price equilibrium,






￿j). From this point, if ￿rm j foregoes price
adjustment in the face of higher production costs, there is no change in revenue or demand,













j = ￿cjdmj = ￿cjmjc mj,
where the superscript "N" stands for "non-adjustment." This expression holds equally for both
related parties and the arm￿ s length ￿rms. To consider the change in pro￿ts that would occur
under adjustment (represented with "A") to this shock, I write the second-order approximation





























11where the expressions will di⁄er for related parties and arm￿ s length ￿rms. The overall in-
centive to change prices, an object that implies shorter price durations as it gets bigger, is
approximated as the di⁄erence between the two: d￿A
j ￿ d￿N
j .
I show in Appendix A that @￿
+
j =@mj = ￿cj for both types of ￿rms, and hence the ￿rst
order terms for the change in pro￿t with and without adjustment cancel. As a result, the









arm￿ s length markup structure leads to an expression for the adjustment incentive:
￿AL;j = ("j ￿ 1)sj￿jcx; (7)
where cx denotes total spending on the sector￿ s inputs. After ￿xing manufacturer revenues,
￿AL;j can be written as the product of ("j ￿ 1) and ￿j, as is the focus of Gopinath and Itskhoki
(forthcoming), which ￿rst derived such an expression for the arm￿ s length case in a similar
model with monopolistic competition.
Unfortunately, it cannot be shown analytically that in the arm￿ s length case, more het-
erogenous good prices will always be stickier because d￿AL;j=d￿ cannot be unambiguously
signed. Hence, to get a sense for the comparative static of duration with respect to degree
of heterogeneity, I consider the following numerical exercise, plotted in Figure 1. I set initial
productivity levels equal, mAL;j = mAL;￿j, and pick a uniform value for the adjustment cost ￿.
Under this con￿guration, each ￿rm starts with equal market share. Starting from equilibrium
in the ￿ exible price model (noted with the black plus sign), a ￿rm observes its own cost shock
and its competitor￿ s price change and determines if adjustment merits payment of the ￿xed
cost.
The left plot is drawn from the perspective of an arm￿ s length manufacturer in a highly
di⁄erentiated sector, where shocks to its competitor￿ s price and its own cost are represented
with the horizontal and vertical axes, respectively. The right plot is the exact same, but for
an arm￿ s length manufacturer in a less di⁄erentiated sector (with higher ￿). The red regions
are then de￿ned as the portions of the state space where a ￿rm does not adjust prices and the
boundaries can be thought of as s-S bands.
The scenario where a ￿rm￿ s production cost increases by 5 percent and the competitor
raises prices by 10 percent is represented by a move upward from the black plus sign by 0.05
12and to the right by 0.10. If such a move does not exit the red region, it means that given
these shocks, a ￿rm would not change its price. If such a move crosses the upper boundary
into the "raise" region, it means the shocks are su¢ ciently large to warrant a price increase,
even if facing an adjustment cost.
The ￿rst key observation is that the no-adjust region for both arm￿ s length ￿rms has
negative slope. If a change in the other ￿rm￿ s price is large enough, it can induce the ￿rst ￿rm
to change prices, even if the ￿rst ￿rm does not incur a shock to its marginal cost. This is the
visual manifestation of the strategic complementarity in the model and is the force generating
synchronization in the timing of price changes. Secondly, the vertical width of the band is
wider for the more di⁄erentiated, or heterogenous, case. Given the degree of stickiness in
the data, own-cost shocks are far more prevalent than competitor-price shocks and hence, the
vertical width is the crucial determinant of stickiness. It is clear that any given cost shock is
more likely to exit the red region, up or down, for the less di⁄erentiated good arm￿ s length
￿rm. Though one can ￿nd places in the parameter space where these results do not hold,
they are far away from the most natural benchmarks such as symmetry and generally require
signi￿cantly skewed productivity distributions in the sector.
3.4 Static One-Period Game: Intra￿rm Case
I now consider the same exercise but ￿xing the sector￿ s elasticity of substitution and instead
focusing on the comparison of arm￿ s length and related party trades. I show that the model
can match the empirical results showing that intra￿rm prices change more frequently and
with less synchronization. The related party pricing structure leads to an expressions for the
adjustment incentive ￿RP;j:
￿RP;j = "jsjcx; (8)
where cx denotes total spending on the sector￿ s inputs.
The di⁄erence between the related party expression in (8) and the arm￿ s length expression
in (7) re￿ ects the fact that a ￿rm￿ s cost of goods sold, COGSj = cjmj, scales each ￿rm￿ s
incentive to change prices for a given percentage cost shock. Since arm￿ s length ￿rms charge
a markup and related parties do not, the cost of goods sold is related di⁄erently to market
shares and elasticities for the two ￿rms. Substituting COGSRP;j = sRP;jcx and COGSAL;j =
13sAL;jcx
"j￿1
"j into expressions (8) and (7), we can write the incentives as ￿AL;j = "j￿jCOGSAL;j
and ￿RP;j = "jCOGSRP;j. This gives the intuition for why related party duration will be
shorter, conditional on the market share, and all other things equal. The market share uniquely
determines the demand elasticity "j, and given the related party charges no markup, its cost
of goods sold must be higher. The variable markup component of passthrough, ￿j, is strictly
less than one, so ￿RP;j > ￿AL;j.
In Appendix A, I demonstrate for the two-￿rm case that sAL;j < ￿=(2￿ ￿ 1) = sAL is a
su¢ cient, though not necessary, condition for ￿RP > ￿AL. Note that as ￿ ! 1, sAL ! 1,
and there is no portion of the parameter space where the approximation suggests stickier
related parties, regardless of initial productivities. In the model￿ s other extreme, as ￿ ! 1,
sAL ! 1=2. Given arm￿ s length markups exceed those of related parties, this implies that
with equal productivities, related parties are less sticky everywhere in the parameter space.
Numerical exercises suggest that for any given ￿, an increase in ￿ increases the maximum arm￿ s
length market share below which its prices will be sticker. For plausible parameter values in
this model, the threshold is at least two-thirds, and often much higher. This absolute level
will of course decrease in a multi￿rm model, but the requirement that arm￿ s length ￿rms hold
a signi￿cantly larger market share in order to be less sticky will generally hold, regardless of
the number of ￿rms. Hence, this static model generally predicts less sticky intra￿rm prices.
Further, Figure 2 shows s-S bands similar to those shown for the arm￿ s length case, but
instead of comparing across elasticities of substitution, it compares the pricing decision of an
arm￿ s length ￿rm (left) to that of a related party (right). Again, I set initial productivity
levels equal, mAL = mRP, and pick a uniform value for the adjustment cost ￿. This implies
market shares will di⁄er, but plots from the case of equal market shares are qualitatively the
same.
First, note that the no-adjust region for the related party is essentially ￿ at. This means
that, when integrated ￿rm prices are close enough to their ￿ exible price target, there is no
price change from the competitor (arm￿ s length) ￿rm that could induce a ￿rm to change its
own price. Only as one moves vertically away from the horizontal line pRP = 1 does the region
begins to have any curvature. This follows because the result that related party price setting
is inwardly focused is only strictly true when at the ￿ exible price equilibrium. In this sense,
Figure 2 helps one visualize why the model is able to produce greater synchronization among
14arm￿ s length trades than intra￿rm trades. Secondly, the vertical width of the band is smaller
for the related party case, indicating less price stickiness and corroborating the results from
the second order approximation.
4 Recursive Formulation and Solution
Some of the above intuitions on what drives incomplete exchange rate passthrough and syn-
chronization in arm￿ s length ￿rms have been shown previously in models with ￿ exible prices,
such as Atkeson and Burstein (2008). Adding price stickiness is important to ensure that these
intuitions from the ￿ exible price literature are preserved when realistic frictions are added and
when simulated data better resembles the highly sticky price data actually tested by empiri-
cists. Further, the previous sections￿derivations rely on several simplifying assumptions or
approximations, abstract from option value, and consider the occurrence of each shock and
each ￿rm￿ s pricing decision only one at a time. In reality, ￿rms have expectations about each
other￿ s responses to shocks and typically start periods away from their ￿ exible price equilib-
rium. In this section, we move to a dynamic setting in order to address these shortcomings.
The monetary authority maintains a constant retail price level, P t = 1, and thus ￿xes
aggregate consumption, Ct = 1. This leaves four principal state variables in the system ￿the
two manufacturing prices from the previous period and the two marginal costs in the current







dynamics are generated by the fully observable shocks to the marginal cost of production for
each ￿rm.
The other source of dynamics follows from the random adjustment cost, ￿
t
j, drawn identi-
cally and independently each period from the distributions Gj(￿). This follows Dotsey, King,
and Wolman (1999) and renders the problem more tractable. Though ￿rms know the distri-
bution of their competitor￿ s adjustment cost, they only observe their own realized cost. This
assumption of random and private adjustment costs is helpful because it rules out certain
cases in which there would be multiple (or no) equilibria. It allows for a game in pure strate-
gies, but where each player treats the other as if she were playing a mixed strategy due to
uncertainty about the other￿ s state. As implemented, this assumption does not impact any of
the qualitative results.
15Firms follow pure strategies in price setting. For a given state f￿t;￿
t
jg, each ￿rm j
simultaneously chooses a unique price. As emphasized in Doraszelski and Satterthwaite
(forthcoming), due to the uncertainty about the competitor￿ s adjustment cost, a ￿rm gen-
erally does not know with certainty what strategy its competitor will play. Hence, from
the perspective of ￿rm ￿j, the probability that ￿rm j changes prices in a given period is
￿j(￿) =
R
￿j(￿;￿j)dGj(￿j). A Markov Perfect Equilibrium is de￿ned as a set of pricing




j maximizes expected ￿rm pro￿ts, consistent
with consumer demand, and where each ￿rm has correct expectations about the distribution
of its competitor￿ s prices across realizations of the competitor￿ s adjustment cost.
Let Vj(￿;￿j) denote the conditional values of the ￿rm, after each has observed its own























for ￿rm j. Here, it is easy to see the di¢ culty in modeling this type of strategic behavior
￿it requires solving a coupled system of Belman equations where each ￿rm￿ s optimal policy
depends on the other￿ s. Vj(￿0) =
R
Vj(￿0;￿j)dGj(￿j) is the expected value function of ￿rm j;
conditional on being in state ￿0, but before observing its adjustment cost (expectations here
are taken only over uncertainty about the realization of this cost).
Following Doraszelski and Satterthwaite (forthcoming), I integrate both sides of these
Belman equations over all realizations of their respective adjustment costs and re-write the
value function in equation (9), which is a function of ￿ve variables, as the expected value
























Expected pro￿t, E[￿j], is the probability weighted average across the four combinations of
fadjust;no-adjustg ￿ fadjust;no-adjustg, and the transition of the ￿rst two state variables is
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Subject to the above system of demand, production, and cost shocks, the two ￿rms play
a non-cooperative dynamic game in pure Markov pricing strategies. I follow Midrigan (2006,
forthcoming) and Miranda and Vedenov (2001) and use projection methods (collocation,
speci￿cally) to approximate the solution to this coupled system of Belman equations.10 A
detailed description of the solution algorithm is given in Appendix B. Figure 3 shows a sam-
ple plot (holding ￿xed the values for the competitor￿ s previous price and current cost) of
a policy function from the solution of the model. The vertical axis gives the conditional
probability of a price change before observing the menu cost realization and the x- and y-
axes give the ￿rm￿ s previous price and current cost. This plot makes clear that, despite the
time-dependency added by the stochastic menu cost, the model preserves its state-dependent
￿ avor. The probability of a price change ￿ uctuates dramatically across the state space, even if
it transitions more smoothly than the zero to one ￿ uctuations in a standard state-dependent
model.
5 Simulation Results
To compare the model￿ s predictions for price duration, passthrough, and sychronization with
the data, I take the approximated policy functions and generate series of costs and prices
for various ranges of the parameter space. The two-input structure of my model rules out
treatment of the simulation as a true calibration exercise ￿ I do not focus on comparing
precise quantitative levels of variables in the simulation to the data, but rather, show that I
can match the key features of the data on arm￿ s length and intra￿rm duration, passthrough,
10The techniques used are described in-depth in Miranda and Fackler (2002), which also provides an ac-
companying MATLAB toolbox (CompEcon) that was used extensively for this paper.
17and synchronization.
I solve two versions of the model. First, I simulate a sector with two arm￿ s length ￿rms
to test if the model generates price durations that increase with heterogeneity, incomplete
passthrough even after a price change, and greater than random synchronization in price
changes. Next, I simulate a sector with one arm￿ s length and one related party ￿rm to test if
the model generates less intra￿rm stickiness, higher passthrough, and lower synchronization.
I simulate these two structures for four sectors with varying elasticities of substitution, ￿. The
period length is intended to represent one month and the discount factor is set at ￿ = 0:99.
I set a normal distribution for the monthly shock process, ￿, with a standard deviation of
2.5 percent for both manufacturers, roughly that of the U.S. dollar to Euro exchange rate.
Identical uniform distributions (with limited support) are used for each ￿rm￿ s adjustment
costs such that the median duration magnitude roughly ￿ts the level of stickiness in the
international trade micro-data and results in spending on adjustment as a share of annual
manufacturing revenues of about 0.2 percent.
I consider three cases: In the ￿rst, I set the ￿rms￿ steady state market shares equal
(sj = s￿j); in the second, I set productivities equal (mj = m￿j); and in the third, I set
the ￿rms￿steady state cost of goods sold to be equal (cjmj = c￿jm￿j). For the case with
related parties, these scenarios imply the related party￿ s market share will be equal, larger,
and smaller, respectively, than that of the arm￿ s length ￿rm. When simulating the sector with
two arm￿ s length ￿rms, I choose productivities such that the ￿rst has both equal demand and
market share compared to the arm￿ s length ￿rm in the hybrid sector.11 As shown in Section
3, price stickiness is proportional to the spending on a sector, so for each set of parameter
values, I vary aggregate consumption to equalize steady state spending on the manufacturing
sector.
I set ￿ = 0:75, which of course will scale down passthrough levels for both ￿rms.12 This
and other parameter values are summarized below:
11This, of course, implies that the second ￿rm, whose statistics are not reported, does not have the same
productivity as the related party in the hybrid case.
12In the open-economy interpretation of the model, this parameter is consistent with a typical import share
from OECD input-output tables.
18￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿Min ￿Max
2 0.99 0.5 0.75 0.025 0.985 4 10
Figure 4 shows an example of the price and cost series generated by the simulation program.
The prices and costs are plotted against the left axis, while the probability of adjustment ￿j is
indicated by the shaded bars and is measured on the right axis. In the start of year 5, arm￿ s
length ￿rm j increases its price even though its own cost has clearly been declining. This is
labeled an "example of complementarity" because the price increase is clearly driven by the
(correct) expectation that the other ￿rm, it￿ s competitor, would increase its own price. Again,
this feature is typically excluded from state-dependent models. Figures 5-8 report the results
from these simulations, including median price durations, cost passthrough conditional on a
price change, and a measure of synchronization. I now discuss these simulations and compare
each in turn to the empirical facts.
5.1 Duration: Empirics and Simulation
The empirical results suggest that more heterogenous arm￿ s length prices change less fre-
quently. For example, Gopinath and Rigobon (2008) show in their Table IV that the mean
frequency of price change for reference priced (i.e. homogenous) goods is more than twice
that of di⁄erentiated goods. "Raw goods", a highly substitutable category, is the least sticky
in Bils and Klenow (2004) while Medical care, presumably highly di⁄erentiated, is the most
sticky. Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) show that less di⁄erentiated goods like "unprocessed
food", "vehicle fuel", or "transportation goods" change prices far more often than more di⁄er-
entiated products like "processed food" or "services". Figure 5 plots the median arms length
duration in the three market share con￿gurations against the elasticity of substitution (￿) and
shows that in this model, for sensible parameter values, price duration or stickiness decreases
as goods become less di⁄erentiated.
Further, Neiman (2010) shows that related party prices are stickier than arm￿ s length
prices in the same sector. Figure 6 plots the median for arm￿ s length and intra￿rm prices in
sectors with both types of ￿rms and for the three market share con￿gurations and four values
of substitution elasticities. The solid lines in the ￿gure report price statistics from the arm￿ s
length ￿rms while the dashed lines do so for the intra￿rm prices. Colors and labels indicate
19which market share con￿guration was used to generate the median duration series. Again,
the model is able to match the empirical observation that median price durations are shorter
for intra￿rm prices.13
5.2 Passthrough: Empirics and Simulation
Many recent papers have demonstrated that, even conditional on price adjustment, cost
passthrough is less than 1, including Gopinath et al. (forthcoming), Burstein and Jaimovich
(2009), and Fizgerald and Haller (2009). Others, such as Bernard et al. (2006), Hellerstein
and Villas-Boas (forthcoming), and Neiman (2010) have shown that such passthrough mea-
sures are lower for arm￿ s length than for intra￿rm price changes. To capture this concept in
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j ) denotes the accumulated change in the cost shock from
the time of previous price change to the time of the most recent change. Figure 7 plots this
passthrough coe¢ cient (which, given it is run on simulated data, is very precisely estimated)
for arm￿ s length prices in the two arm￿ s length ￿rm structure and for intra￿rm prices in the
hybrid structure. As in the data, arm￿ s length conditional passthrough is clearly incomplete
and is below that of related parties.14
13Another natural assumption might be that intra￿rm adjustment costs are lower than arm￿ s length ad-
justment costs. This could certainly replicate the ￿nding of lower intra￿rm duration, but could not explain
the results on passthrough and synchronization. Further, as mentioned in Neiman (2010), this would imply
counterfactual di⁄erences in the size distribution of price changes.
14Passthrough estimates in the micro-data literature are quite small and range from about 10 percent to
about 50 percent. As with most of the passthrough literature, this model￿ s average arm￿ s length rate of
passthrough of 55 percent is thus too high. I acknowledge this, and focus on the model￿ s ability to match the
comparative statics of passthrough in the data.
205.3 Synchronization: Empirics and Simulation
Finally, Cavallo (2009) and Midrigan (2006) demonstrate that price changes are synchronized,
and Neiman (2010) additionally ￿nds that this synchronization is larger for arm￿ s length
transactions than for intra￿rm transactions. There is no standard measure used to quantify
price change synchronization. Here, I observe the percentage of simulated months in which
both manufacturers￿prices change and compare it to the percentage that would be randomly
generated. For instance, if ￿rm 1 changes its prices every d1 months, and ￿rm 2 does so every
d2 months, zero synchronization would imply the existence of months with two prices changes
about 100=(d1d2) percent of the time. Hence, I measure synchronization in the simulated
data as a ratio ("synchronization ratio") of the frequency of months with two price changes
to the frequency that would be expected with randomly timed changes. The vast majority of
time-dependent models would, for example, generate ratio values of 1. Values greater than 1
suggest synchronization in the data.
Figure 8 shows the synchronization ratio for the sectors with both arm￿ s length ￿rms as
well as for the hybrid sectors. With only one exception, the ratios are greater than 1 and
demonstrate that the model produces price change synchronization. While the analytics and
static exercise in Section 3 indicate that, all things equal, we expect less synchronization in
hybrid sectors with a related party, it is impossible to generate hybrid and fully non-integrated
sectors with all things equal. Nonetheless, the hybrid sector exhibits less synchronization in
8 of the 12 simulations, consistent with the evidence that related party price changes are less
synchronized.
6 Conclusion
A large number of recent empirical studies have documented new facts on stickiness, cost
passthrough, and synchronization in ￿nal good and traded intermediate prices. Arm￿ s length
price stickiness is heterogenous and decreases with the elasticity of demand for a good. Incom-
plete cost passthrough is not simply a function of nominal rigidities and persists even after
prices are changed. There is evidence of bunching in the timing of price changes. Further,
studies that consider transactions between related parties have found that intra￿rm sticki-
ness and synchronization are lower and passthrough is higher. These facts present challenges
21to traditional pricing models in the open- and closed-economy macroeconomics literature. I
write a model of intermediate good pricing that can be used to describe both arm￿ s length
and intra￿rm pricing strategies and is capable of delivering all these empirical patterns.
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32Appendix A: Additional Calculations and Proofs
This appendix gives details for several of the calculations made in the text.
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2￿AL b m2 demonstrates the claim.
Claim 2 We wish to show:
￿RP = sRP"RPcx:












































@mRP = ￿cRP, because pRP = mRP and, hence,
dpRP
dmRP = 1. The
remaining steps follow those in Claim 1.
Claim 3 We de￿ne ￿=(2￿ ￿ 1) = sAL and wish to show that:
sAL < sAL =) ￿RP > ￿AL:
We write:
￿RP = sRP"RPcx





1 ￿ 2sAL + s2
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AL + ￿sAL(1 ￿ sAL) ￿ sAL
￿
￿cx:
In this form, it is easy to see:
(￿￿RP ￿ ￿AL)=￿cx = ￿ (1 ￿ 2sAL) + sAL:
Factoring out the arm￿ s length share, we see that:
sAL < ￿=(2￿ ￿ 1) =) ￿￿RP > ￿AL;
and since ￿ < 1, this implies ￿RP > ￿AL.
34Appendix B: Model Solution and Simulation
This appendix gives details of the projection method used to ￿nd an approximate solution to the
model in Section 2 and to generate simulated data.15 Application of these methods to a model of
adjustment costs follows Midrigan (2006, forthcoming) and their use for solving a dynamic game fol-
lows Miranda and Vedenov (2001). Miranda and Fackler (2002) provides an accompanying MATLAB
toolbox (CompEcon) that was used extensively.
I approximate each of the two expected value functions (10) with a linear combination of orthog-
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where  ij is an ijth degree Chebyshev polynomial and is a function of the jth state variable. The







for ink = 1:::Nk and k = 1:::4. Since there are
two value functions to estimate (one for each ￿rm), this reduces the problem to solving a system of
2N1N2N3N4 equations in 2N1N2N3N4 unknown coe¢ cients, bi1i2i3i4.
The algorithm starts with a guess for the coe¢ cients on the Chebyshev basis polynomials and
the optimal policies for each ￿rm at each collocation node. Since the approximated function is an
expected (rather than realized) value function, this policy is the pro￿t maximizing price, conditional
on an adjustment cost su¢ ciently low to warrant a price change. This potential price (together with
the distribution function Gj(￿)) implicitly de￿nes the probability of price adjustment.
Given the initial set of collocation coe¢ cients and taking the guess for the other ￿rm￿ s optimal
policy as given, I use a modi￿ed Newton routine to solve simultaneously for each ￿rm￿ s optimal
price, conditional on adjustment, at each collocation node. The ￿rst order condition (FOC) has a
term re￿ ecting pro￿ts given an adjustment price as well as the expected continuation value given this
price. In order to approximate this latter term, I discretize the joint distribution of cost (exchange
rate) shocks and integrate using Gaussian quadrature. After each Newton step, I calculate the
probability of adjustment, ￿j, implied by the optimal adjustment price because this probability
enters the competitor￿ s own optimization problem (9). This process continues until the FOC of both
￿rms is su¢ ciently close to zero and the probability of adjustment does not change with additional
iterations.
Finally, a combination of function iteration with dampening and Newton￿ s method with back-
stepping is used to determine the next set of Chebyshev polynomial coe¢ cients to consider. With
this new set of collocation coe¢ cients, a new set of equilibrium policies is found. The process is
repeated until the changes in the basis coe¢ cients and optimal policies in each iteration, as well as
15I thank Uli Doraszelski for his very helpful advice on the numerical methods detailed in this section.
35the di⁄erences between the right-hand side and left-hand side of the expected value function (10) at
the collocation nodes, are extremely small.
The accuracy of the approximations can be gauged by calculating the di⁄erence between the
left- and right-hand sides of the ￿rm￿ s expected value functions at a set of nodes denser than the
collocation nodes. For some of the parameter con￿gurations tested, these errors are larger than would
be desirable, at average respective levels of about 1e-4 and 5e-4 and maximum levels of about 7e-4
and 4e-3 for the related party and arm￿ s length ￿rms, when expressed as a share of the expected value
functions. This lack of precision, in addition to the two-￿rm structure, precludes treatment of the
simulation as a true calibration exercise. The consistency of the comparative statics and qualitative
results across approximations with varying numbers of collocation nodes, however, suggests this level
of accuracy is su¢ cient to demonstrate the key points in this paper.16
The above procedure generates a solution for a given set of parameter values. To consider other
parameter values, I start with the solution to a close by problem (in the sense that the parameter
values are close) and use simple continuation methods. There are no guarantees these will work,
however, and I often had to try varying multiple parameters, including the number of collocation
nodes itself, in order to move around the parameter space.17 Once a solution to the above system of
equations has been approximated, I simulate the cost shocks and generate simulated pricing responses
from the ￿rms.
There is no way to guarantee a suitable starting guess for policies from new locations in the
parameter space (after random cost shocks), so the algorithm occasionally does not converge. In such
cases, I simply draw a di⁄erent shock value and try again. These instances account for far less than
one percent of all simulated good-periods. With simulated cost and pricing data, I generate measures
for key statistics such as the unconditional duration (or stickiness) of prices, the synchronization of
price changes, and the pass-through of cost shocks.
16Given the very similar results for varying numbers of nodes, most results in the ￿gures re￿ ect faster
simulations with less nodes than that used to measure the size of approximation errors.
17See Chapter 5 of Judd (1988) for a discussion of simple continuation methods.
36